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Regulating Prosecutors’ Courtroom Misconduct 
Bruce A. Green* 
Trial prosecutors’ visible misbehavior, such as improper questioning of 
witnesses and improper jury arguments, may not seem momentous. 
Sometimes, the improprieties are simply the product of poor training or 
overenthusiasm. In many cases, they pass unremarked. As the Chicago Eight 
trial illustrated, trial prosecutors’ improprieties may also be overshadowed 
by the excesses of other trial participants—the witnesses, the defendants, the 
defense lawyers, or even the trial judge. And when noticed, prosecutors’ trial 
misbehavior can ordinarily be remedied, and then restrained, by a capable 
trial judge. It is little wonder that disciplinary authorities, having bigger fish 
to fry, are virtually indifferent to the problem. And yet, in the obvious 
absence of disciplinary regulation, prosecutors and their offices have less 
motivation to play by the rules. 
The challenge for disciplinary regulation is to find a proportional 
response to trial misconduct—one that does not punish prosecutors 
undeservedly, unnecessarily, or too harshly but that nevertheless serves 
regulatory ends. Building on the Supreme Court’s observation that a 
prosecutor’s repeated improprieties should be met with “stern rebukes,” this 
Article proposes that prosecutorial improprieties that are deserving of 
judicial rebuke should not be forgotten. Rather, repositories—or rebuke 
banks—should be maintained to preserve transcripts of prosecutors’ on-the-
record misconduct, even when it is committed unintentionally. Maintaining 
these records, which would be relatively easy in the computer age, would 
serve salutary regulatory ends while maintaining the necessary sense of 
proportionality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Decades of writings have addressed prosecutors’ “[v]isible, forensic 
misconduct,”1 such as their improper questioning of witnesses, 
introduction of inadmissible evidence, and improper arguments to the 
jury.2 It is unsurprising that so much attention has been drawn to 
prosecutors’ efforts to put improper considerations before the jury and to 
comparable courtroom excesses, since this misconduct is recorded in trial 
transcripts and often challenged on appeal, generating published 
appellate opinions.3 No doubt, the problem is perennial and unceasing4—
indeed, it appears to be the most commonly reported species of 
prosecutorial misconduct.5 But it is not necessarily the most serious 
 
1. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor’s Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 563 
(1987). 
2. See, e.g., H. Mitchell Caldwell, The Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct, Accountability, and a 
Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 51 (2013); Michael D. Cicchini, Combating Prosecutorial 
Misconduct in Closing Arguments, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 887 (2018); Robert W. Clifford, Identifying 
and Preventing Improper Prosecutorial Comment in Closing Argument, 51 ME. L. REV. 241 
(1999); James W. Gunson, Prosecutorial Summation: Where Is the Line Between “Personal 
Opinion” and Proper Argument?, 46 ME. L. REV. 241, 246 (1994); Frederick J. Ludwig, The Role 
of the Prosecutor in a Fair Trial, 41 MINN. L. REV. 602, 613–15 (1957); Richard G. Singer, 
Forensic Misconduct by Federal Prosecutors—and How It Grew, 20 ALA. L. REV. 227 (1968); 
Henry Blaine Vess, Walking a Tightrope: A Survey of Limitations on the Prosecutor’s Closing 
Argument, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22 (1973); J. Lyndal Hagemeyer, Note, Statements by 
Prosecuting Attorneys to Juries Which Demand Improper Considerations for Verdict or 
Punishment, 39 VA. L. REV. 85 (1953); Praatika Prasad, Note, Implicit Racial Biases in 
Prosecutorial Summations: Proposing an Integrated Response, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091 (2018). 
3. For a discussion of trial prosecutors’ improprieties, together with extensive citations to 
appellate case law, see BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT chs. 10–11 (2d. 
ed. 2018–2019), and JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT: LAW, PROCEDURE, 
FORMS chs. 9–10 (4th ed. 2018). 
4. See United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., 
dissenting) (“This court has several times used vigorous language in denouncing government 
counsel for such conduct as that of the United States Attorney here. But, each time, it has said that, 
nevertheless, it would not reverse. Such an attitude of helpless piety is, I think, undesirable.”); Paul 
J. Spiegelman, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument: The Role of Intent in Appellate 
Review, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 115, 115–17 (1999) (noting “the abuse and disregard of 
forensic propriety which threatens to become staple in American prosecutions” (quoting ROSCOE 
POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 187 (1930))). 
5. See KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, N. CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
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problem of prosecutorial misconduct. Relatively few criminal cases go to 
trial nowadays. When prosecutors engage in visible forensic misconduct, 
it is often a result of prosecutors’ negligence, overexuberance, or 
inadequate training,6 not a calculated decision to violate procedural 
norms governing courtroom behavior.7 And it is assumed that this 
misconduct is not ordinarily prejudicial, because capable trial judges can 
ordinarily reduce or avert its impact by sustaining an objection and 
issuing a curative instruction.8 One might be forgiven for thinking that 
other aspects of prosecutorial misconduct are more serious and therefore 
worthy of study and reform.9 
Nevertheless, this Article argues that courts should take prosecutors’ 
 
PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997–2009 
(2010); Harry Mitchell Caldwell, Everybody Talks About Prosecutorial Conduct but Nobody Does 
Anything About It: A 25-Year Survey of Prosecutorial Misconduct and a Viable Solution, 2017 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1455. 
6. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 723 So. 2d 896, 897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (Altenbernd, J., 
concurring) (observing that “[t]here are about a dozen bad tactics that this court sees with regularity 
in closing arguments” and suggesting that continuing legal education videotapes be made for 
prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers demonstrating improper arguments), quoted in Craig Lee 
Montz, Why Lawyers Continue to Cross the Line in Closing Argument: An Examination of Federal 
and State Cases, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 67, 131 (2001). The vagueness of the relevant standards, 
in some cases, may also contribute to the prosecutor’s transgression. See Hagemeyer, supra note 2, 
at 97. 
7. See Bruce A. Green, The Ethical Prosecutor and the Adversary System, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 
126, 141 (1988) (noting that, particularly in rebuttal arguments, prosecutors may make improper 
statements because of the lack of time for deliberation in selecting one’s wording). But see 
Spiegelman, supra note 4 (discussing cases of intentional and recurring prosecutorial wrongdoing). 
8. See Green, supra note 7, at 139–40 (noting “that most prosecutorial errors in summation, 
viewed individually, are not serious enough to affect the outcome of a trial”). 
9. Contemporary writings on prosecutors’ work do increasingly focus on prosecutors’ “serious 
misconduct.” See, e.g., Thomas P. Sullivan & Maurice Possley, The Chronic Failure to Discipline 
Prosecutors for Misconduct: Proposals for Reform, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 881 (2015). 
These include writings on various conduct that is invisible and less easily detectable, such as 
prosecutors’ failure to disclose evidence and information. In particular, contemporary writings on 
prosecutors’ conduct have increasingly focused on prosecutors’ compliance with their disclosure 
obligations. See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2015); R. Michael 
Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of Impeachment Disclosures, 
64 VAND. L. REV. 1429 (2011); Bruce A. Green, Federal Criminal Discovery Reform: A Legislative 
Approach, 64 MERCER L. REV. 639 (2013); Susan R. Klein, Monitoring the Plea Process, 51 DUQ. 
L. REV. 559 (2013); Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533 
(2010); New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working 
Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961 (2010). These also include writings on 
prosecutorial conduct that affects a broader array of cases, such as prosecutors’ abuse of discretion 
in charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, 
Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A 
Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143 (2016); Susan R. Klein et al., 
Waiving the Criminal Justice System: An Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 73 (2015). 
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courtroom misconduct more seriously. While many relevant writings 
focus on how courts remedy prosecutorial misconduct,10 this Article joins 
those emphasizing courts’ disciplinary role.11 It acknowledges that courts 
should respond with varying levels of severity to lawyers’ trial 
misconduct, including that of prosecutors, and that improper questions 
and arguments are ordinarily minor infractions. As the Chicago Eight 
trial, discussed in Part I, well illustrates, trial judges deserve criticism 
when they overreact, as well as when they fail to react, to trial 
participants’ perceived misconduct. Although trial and appellate courts 
have a regulatory responsibility, described in Part II, to set standards of 
proper trial conduct and to protect defendants from being prejudiced by 
prosecutors’ misbehavior at trial, courts’ sense of proportionality 
counsels against punishing prosecutors whose small transgressions are 
isolated occurrences. 
But overlooking prosecutorial misconduct is not necessarily the best 
regulatory strategy. This Article argues in Part III that if judges do not 
adequately police minor prosecutorial misconduct when it occurs in plain 
view, prosecutors may not only continue minor transgressions but also 
treat more serious rules more cavalierly. This Article urges courts to play 
a more robust regulatory rule. The challenge is to identify a response that 
strikes the right balance between proportionality and deterrence. 
This Article proposes in Part IV that courts or disciplinary authorities 
maintain “rebuke banks”—that is, repositories of trial transcripts 
reflecting prosecutorial misbehavior that earned or deserved a rebuke. 
These repositories will serve several regulatory functions, including (1) 
increasing the efficacy of judicial rebukes, (2) facilitating more serious 
discipline of prosecutors who repeatedly transgress, (3) facilitating 
discipline of supervisory personnel and prosecutors’ offices when trial 
prosecutors’ repeated transgressions are attributable to inadequate 
training and oversight, and (4) facilitating prosecutorial training. Ideally, 
more robust regulation of low-level prosecutorial misconduct will 
strengthen internal professional controls that keep more serious 
misconduct in check. And, incidentally, in their role as regulators, 
prosecutors may develop greater empathy for individuals who engage in 
low-level criminal wrongdoing. 
 
10. See, e.g., Mary Nicol Bowman, Mitigating Foul Blows, 49 GA. L. REV. 309 (2015). 
11. See, e.g., RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 5; David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial 
Accountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures 
Cannot Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203 (2011). 
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I.  A STARTING POINT: THE CHICAGO EIGHT TRIAL 
The Chicago Eight trial (which became the Chicago Seven trial) may 
have been iconic,12 but it was scarcely exemplary except in a negative 
sense.13 Over the course of the five-month trial, all of the participants, 
including District Judge Hoffman, behaved badly. The trial has been held 
up to exemplify bad courtroom management.14 For the most part, that is 
because of the trial judge’s hostility and repressive measures toward the 
defense.15 But a small part of the judge’s mismanagement, and one that 
largely gets overlooked, was his failure to adequately regulate the 
prosecution. 
The Chicago Eight defendants, antiwar activists with several different 
affiliations, were accused of conspiring to encourage rioting in 
connection with antiwar protests held in August 1968 to coincide with 
the Democratic Party’s national convention in Chicago.16 The trial was 
closely watched and highly publicized. Observers on the left had good 
reason to assume that the trial, commencing in September 1969, was 
calculated by the Nixon administration to destroy the antiwar movement. 
The constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act under which the defendants 
were charged was questionable,17 and the accusations seemed dubious, 
given that some of the defendants had publicly promoted nonviolence and 
that the police instigated most of the violence at the protests. 
The defendants and defense lawyers were to varying degrees 
disrespectful and disruptive. District Judge Hoffman overreacted, 
demonstrating hostility toward the defense. At the outset, the judge 
refused to delay the trial so that defendant Bobby Seale’s lawyer, who 
 
12. Martha Neil, 40 Years Later, ‘Chicago 7’ Trial Still an Iconic Event, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 21, 
2009, 10:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/40_years_later_chicago_7_trial_still 
_an_iconic_event. 
13. For accounts of the trial, see, for example, J. ANTHONY LUKAS, THE BARNYARD EPITHET 
AND OTHER OBSCENITIES: NOTES ON THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY TRIAL (1970). 
14. See, e.g., Pnina Lahav, The Chicago Conspiracy Trial: Character and Judicial Discretion, 
71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1327, 1337–38 (2000) (discussing how intrinsically unfair and inappropriate 
it was for Judge Hoffman to bind and gag Bobby Seale in the course of the trial); Michael P. Scharf, 
Chaos in the Courtroom: Controlling Disruptive Defendants and Contumacious Counsel in War 
Crimes Trials, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 155, 159 (2007) (noting that the Chicago Seven trial is 
seen as a particularly low point in United States courtroom history). 
15. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Regulating Discourtesy on the Bench: A Study 
in the Evolution of Judicial Independence, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 535 (2009) (noting 
that the reprehensibility of the Chicago Seven trial is mainly seen in the judge’s hostility and actions 
toward the defense). 
16. See United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 348–54 (7th Cir. 1972). 
17. Id. at 409 (Pell, J., dissenting). 
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needed emergency surgery, could participate.18 Six weeks into the trial, 
having ordered Seale bound and gagged in response to his disruptions and 
insults, Judge Hoffman granted him a mistrial.19 Although moments of 
relative calm followed, and some defendants presented a conventional 
defense, defendants Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin sought to turn the 
trial into political theater, and particularly toward the end, the trial 
erupted. In closing argument, the prosecutor unfairly alluded to the 
defendants’ misbehavior and demeanor.20 In the end, two defendants 
were acquitted on all counts; the other five were acquitted of the alleged 
conspiracy but convicted on substantive counts in what seemed to be a 
compromise verdict.21 Additionally, Judge Hoffman tried all eight 
defendants and two of the defense lawyers for criminal contempt, based 
on their insulting and disruptive trial conduct, and found all ten guilty.22 
The court of appeals overturned the five defendants’ convictions on 
the substantive counts largely because of the trial judge’s inappropriate 
reaction to perceived misconduct from the defense.23 The appeals court 
was especially troubled by Judge Hoffman’s “deprecatory and often 
antagonistic attitude toward the defense” as reflected in statements during 
the trial “implying . . . that defense counsel was inept, bumptious, or 
untrustworthy, or that his case lacked merit.”24 Many of Judge Hoffman’s 
comments to the defense lawyers were gratuitous and sarcastic and 
occurred in the presence of the jury. Taken together, they “telegraphed to 
the jury the judge’s contempt for the defense.”25 Additionally, the 
appellate court found, the prosecutor made arguments at or beyond “the 
outermost boundary of permissible inferences” and improperly referred 
to the defendants’ “[d]ress, personal appearance, and conduct at trial 
[none of which were] probative of guilt.”26 The appellate court also set 
aside all ten contempt convictions and remanded the cases for trial by a 
new judge, finding that Judge Hoffman should never have conducted the 
contempt trials himself, because, as the target of the alleged contemnors’ 
attacks, he could not be impartial.27 On remand, a different judge tried 
the contempt cases, sustained only a handful of the charges, and imposed 
 
18. See United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 349–50 (7th Cir. 1972). 
19. Id. at 350. 
20. In re Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 390. 
21. Id. at 348. 
22. Seale, 461 F.2d 345; In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972). 
23. In re Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 385–91. 
24. Id. at 386–87. 
25. Id. at 387. 
26. Id. at 390. 
27. Seale, 461 F.2d 345; In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389. 
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no punishment.28 
It is easy for the prosecutor’s misconduct to be overlooked in this story. 
His improper jury arguments were isolated, momentary, possibly 
spontaneous, and certainly trivial compared to the extreme misbehavior 
of other participants, including the judge. In contrast to the defense 
lawyers who were tried for contempt of court, the prosecutor suffered 
only whatever embarrassment followed from a critical appellate opinion. 
One might wonder, however, whether the appellate court’s measured 
response to the prosecutor’s improper closing arguments adequately 
served the public interest in regulating prosecutors: Granted that much of 
what is sometimes termed “prosecutorial misconduct” is really just a 
minor departure from procedural norms, do prosecutorial infractions 
merit more than, at worst, a judicial rebuke? 
II.  COURTS’ CONVENTIONAL ROLE IN REGULATING PROSECUTORS’ TRIAL 
INFRACTIONS 
A.  Trial Courts’ Role 
The Supreme Court’s 1935 opinion in Berger v. United States29 
defines trial courts’ conventional role in regulating lawyers’ trial 
misconduct. During cross examination and summation in Berger, the 
prosecutor bullied witnesses and mischaracterized their testimony, 
implied that he possessed extrajudicial knowledge and assumed facts not 
in evidence, and generally “conduct[ed] himself in a thoroughly 
indecorous and improper manner.”30 The Court’s opinion overturning the 
conviction is best remembered for its observations about the prosecutor’s 
role,31 but the opinion also spoke to the role of the trial judge in regulating 
prosecutors who misbehave. Although the district judge in Berger 
sustained some of the defense lawyer’s objections and instructed the jury 
to disregard some of the prosecutor’s improper questions and comments, 
this response, said the Court, was too mild. At the very least, the district 
 
28. In re Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. 1304 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff’d, 502 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974). 
29. 295 U.S. 78 (1935). 
30. Id. at 84. 
31. The Court reminded prosecutors that they are “the servant of the law” whose interest in 
seeing “that justice shall be done” gives them a responsibility to “govern impartially,” to avoid 
“strik[ing] foul [blows],” and to “refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction.” Id. at 88. See also id. (“The United States Attorney is the representative not of an 
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as 
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution 
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”). On the importance of the Court’s 
statement, see Bennett L. Gershman, “Hard Strikes and Foul Blows:” Berger v. United States 75 
Years After, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 177, 201–05 (2010). 
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judge should have met the prosecutor’s misconduct with “stern rebuke 
and repressive measures.”32 And if that did not work, a mistrial might 
have been necessary.33 
The role of the trial judge envisioned by Berger differs from the 
passive, detached or “umpireal” role often associated with appellate 
judges.34 Of necessity, trial judges are expected to take an active, engaged 
role in trials, especially criminal trials, to ensure fair process.35 Among 
other things, this means interceding to remedy and prevent prosecutorial 
misconduct. Of course, trial judges must restrain misconduct not just by 
prosecutors but by all trial lawyers, all of whom are governed by judicial 
decisions and professional conduct rules regulating witness examinations 
and jury arguments.36 Prosecutors are scarcely the only ones who 
sometimes engage in on-the-record courtroom improprieties such as 
those on display in Berger. Other trial lawyers also cross the line,37 as the 
Chicago Eight trial illustrated. Indeed, one can safely assume that 
criminal defense lawyers are far more likely to get away with 
improprieties, if only because acquittals procured through courtroom 
misconduct are exempt from appellate review.38 But trial judges have 
 
32. Berger, 295 U.S. at 85. The Court observed: 
We reproduce in the margin a few excerpts from the record illustrating some of the 
various points of the foregoing summary. It is impossible, however, without reading the 
testimony at some length, and thereby obtaining a knowledge of the setting in which the 
objectionable matter occurred, to appreciate fully the extent of the misconduct. The trial 
judge, it is true, sustained objections to some of the questions, insinuations and 
misstatements, and instructed the jury to disregard them. But the situation was one which 
called for stern rebuke and repressive measures and, perhaps, if these were not 
successful, for the granting of a mistrial. It is impossible to say that the evil influence 
upon the jury of these acts of misconduct was removed by such mild judicial action as 
was taken. 
Id. at 84–85. 
33. Id. at 85. 
34. See Bruce Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Judicial Activism in Trial Courts, 74 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming 2019). 
35. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 84–85; see also Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 248 (1943). 
36. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (A lawyer shall 
not . . . in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that 
will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except 
when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility 
of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused . . . .). 
37. See, e.g., GLEASON L. ARCHER, ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE LAWYER 177–79 (1910) 
(addressing trial lawyers’ duties not to offer improper evidence and not to argue upon matters not 
in evidence); 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY, ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND 
THE PROFESSION GENERALLY 772–73 (Resolution XLVII) (Baltimore, Joseph Neal, 2d ed. 1836) 
(resolving to rely only on “logical and just reasoning” and “such appeals to the sympathies of our 
common nature, as are worthy, legitimate, well timed, and in good taste”). 
38. See State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815, 817 (Minn. 1993) (“Because only convicted 
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reason to be particularly vigilant in overseeing prosecutors, given their 
constitutional commitment to providing fair trials to those accused of 
crime. 
Trial judges have a responsibility to respond to prosecutors’ 
misconduct in two ways in order to protect the fairness of the trial. First, 
trial judges must remedy lawyers’ misconduct, typically by sustaining 
objections and instructing jurors to disregard improper questions and 
arguments. There is a considerable body of judicial opinions about trial 
judges’ curative instructions and whether they were sufficient to cure the 
prejudice caused by a prosecutor’s attempt to influence jurors 
improperly.39 In general, courts presume that jurors follow curative 
instructions. In extreme cases of prosecutorial misconduct, as Berger 
suggests, the remedy may be a mistrial.40 But this is a rare response to 
prosecutorial misconduct.41 
Additionally, as Berger also suggests, trial judges may aim to deter or 
prevent lawyers’ further misconduct in the proceeding. In general, 
lawyers do not want to be on the wrong side of the judge and therefore, 
it will often be effective for a judge simply to tell the lawyer when 
particular conduct is out of bounds and should be discontinued. If more 
is needed, trial judges can communicate their displeasure either explicitly 
or in a manner that may not be fully reflected on the record, such as by 
an irate tone of voice or an angry stare. Berger advises that on top of a 
“stern rebuke,” the trial judge can adopt “repressive measures.”42 These 
might include issuing an order forbidding particular conduct and may 
even include a threat to hold the lawyer in contempt of court if the lawyer 
violates the order. However, contempt of court is an extreme response, 
 
defendants can appeal, this court in opinions tends to focus on prosecutorial misconduct. However, 
this court is aware from reading transcripts of trials that the problem [of improper closing 
arguments] is not limited to the prosecution.”). Accounts of nineteenth and early twentieth century 
criminal trials suggest that, in fact, testing and exceeding the limits of proper trial conduct was part 
of criminal defense lawyers’ art. See generally ALFRED COHN & JOE CHISHOLM, “TAKE THE 
WITNESS!” (1934); RICHARD H. ROVERE, HOWE & HUMMEL: THEIR TRUE AND SCANDALOUS 
HISTORY (1947); RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD, GASLIGHT LAWYERS (2017). 
39. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 171 F.3d 695, 701–02 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding that the 
prosecutor’s misstatement of testimony was not sufficiently mitigated by standard instruction that 
closing arguments are not evidence); id. at 706 & n.4 (Garland, J., dissenting) (citing authority) 
(maintaining that under Supreme Court case law, the instructions sufficiently mitigated prejudice). 
40. 295 U.S. at 84–85. 
41. For an example of where the Court granted a mistrial because of the prosecutor’s improper 
question on cross-examination, see Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982). For an unusual case 
where the prosecutor engaged in deliberate misconduct in closing argument in order to provoke a 
mistrial, see State v. Yetman, 516 S.W.3d 33 (Tex. App. 2016). 
42. 295 U.S. at 84–85. 
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rarely if ever invoked in cases of prosecutors’ forensic misconduct.43 
As Berger illustrates, trial judges often under-regulate prosecutors’ 
courtroom misconduct. In some cases, this is simply because trial judges 
do not recognize that prosecutors’ conduct is improper. The judge may 
be inattentive or inexpert regarding the applicable rules and law, or may 
credit prosecutors with knowing the bounds of propriety and staying 
within them. In other cases, trial judges fail to adequately police 
prosecutors because they do not acknowledge the extent of the 
prosecutor’s impropriety or assume it to be inadvertent and aberrational. 
Judges may have an institutional interest in minimizing the likely impact 
of prosecutors’ misbehavior to avoid the need for a retrial or, if a 
conviction occurs, a reversal of the conviction. In general, if trial judges 
pronounce prosecutorial misconduct to be insignificant, appellate courts 
will defer to that determination. And even when judges recognize that 
prosecutors engaged in misconduct that may be prejudicial, judges may 
be reluctant to rebuke prosecutors, whether because of sympathy for 
prosecutors (or lawyers generally) or, particularly where trial judges are 
not life tenured, out of fear of prosecutorial retaliation.44 
While some trial judges may adequately police their courtrooms by 
remedying prosecutorial misconduct and deterring further misconduct, 
this overlooks trial judges’ disciplinary role. When prosecutors exceed 
the bounds of propriety in their questioning and arguing, trial judges 
conventionally focus on preserving a fair trial. It would be unusual for 
trial judges to refer prosecutors to the disciplinary authorities or to initiate 
either sanctions or contempt proceedings when prosecutors misbehave at 
trial. Trial judges have no obligation to report lawyers’ minor 
transgressions to the disciplinary authority,45 and it appears that trial 
judges are generally remiss in even reporting prosecutors’ serious 
transgressions, which they are obligated to do.46 In part, this is because 
judges perceive their workload to be heavy,47 and resolving cases seems 
 
43. See Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. 
L. REV. 629, 673–76 (1972). Professor Alschuler identified only one case where a prosecutor was 
held in contempt for an improper courtroom statement, but the sanction was reversed on appeal. Id. 
at 674 & n.167 (citing Brutkiewicz v. State, 191 So. 2d 222 (1966)). 
44. For example, in states such as Missouri where lawyers can recuse the judge assigned to a 
case, prosecutors acting in concert may recuse a judge whom they believe to be excessively harsh, 
thereby precluding that judge from presiding over criminal cases. 
45. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (“A judge 
having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
that raises a substantial question regarding the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate authority.” (emphasis added)).  
46. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 5. 
47. See generally Bruce A. Green, The Price of Judicial Economy in the US, 7 OÑATI SOCIO-
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like a more important use of limited time than regulating lawyers. One 
may suspect that many judges have particular sympathy for prosecutors 
or may not want to antagonize the prosecutor’s office by initiating a 
disciplinary inquiry against a prosecutor. 
Even if conscientious trial judges seek to serve regulatory objectives, 
they may reasonably perceive that the objectives of the disciplinary 
system are adequately served through informal measures rather than by 
initiating a formal disciplinary inquiry. Trial judges may have confidence 
that their stern rebukes and other responses to misconduct in the course 
of a trial will educate prosecutors about proper conduct, encourage them 
to engage in further self-education, and motivate them to “play within the 
lines” in future proceedings. If their confidence were well placed, trial 
judges might have no reason to do more, since professional discipline 
would seem to be unnecessarily harsh relative to the prosecutor’s minor 
transgression. 
B.  Appellate Courts’ Role 
Berger also reflects appellate courts’ conventional regulatory role, 
which is twofold—to overturn convictions that may be attributable to the 
prosecutor’s misconduct and to set standards of trial conduct for 
prosecutors in future cases. But appellate judges, like trial judges, do not 
conventionally serve a meaningful disciplinary function for two reasons. 
First, appellate courts, in the context of reviewing convicted 
defendants’ appeals, provide a remedy when a prosecutor’s misconduct 
may have contributed to the defendant’s conviction. Appellate court 
decisions going back to the nineteenth century have overturned 
convictions where prosecutors brought improper considerations before 
the jury, such as by offering inadmissible evidence, asking questions 
without a good faith basis, referring to facts outside the record, or 
appealing to jurors’ sympathy or prejudice.48 
 
LEGAL SERIES 790, 793–808 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3035295. 
48. See, e.g., Holder v. State, 25 S.W. 279 (Ark. 1894) (overturning conviction based 
prosecutor’s improper questions and remarks, where the trial judge’s rebuke was too mild to cure 
prejudice); People v. Wells, 34 P. 1078 (Cal. 1893) (reversing a conviction where a prosecutor 
repeatedly and knowingly asked objectionable questions to imply inadmissible or false 
information); People v. Lee Chuck, 20 P. 719 (Cal. 1889) (reversing a conviction where a 
prosecutor attempted to admit evidence by arguing its effect and using improper testimony); State 
v. Williams, 18 N.W. 682 (Iowa 1884) (reversing conviction where a prosecutor’s opening 
statement included detailed recitation of facts, many of which he failed to prove); People v. Dane, 
26 N.W. 781 (Mich. 1886) (reversing conviction where a prosecutor asserted personal knowledge 
of defendant’s guilt); Hardaway v. State, 54 So. 833 (Miss. 1911) (reversing conviction where a 
prosecutor appealed to racial prejudice). See also ALEXANDER H. ROBBINS, A TREATISE ON 
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But reversals for prosecutors’ forensic misconduct are infrequent for 
several reasons. First, trial judges have broad discretion to decide whether 
and how to respond to courtroom transgressions, starting with the 
question of whether the lawyer’s courtroom conduct is improper.49 
Judges are given considerable leeway, in part, because the relevant facts 
are likely to vary, and the trial judge is best placed to ascertain them; 
because trial judges have many alternative ways to respond to 
misconduct; and because trial judges must make quick decisions with 
little opportunity for analysis and reflection. Moreover, appellate courts 
do not expect perfection. 
Additionally, appellate courts rarely overturn criminal convictions 
merely as a sanction for prosecutors’ courtroom misbehavior.50 Most 
courts will not overturn a conviction if the prosecutor’s misconduct was 
“harmless.”51 If not convinced that the prosecutor’s misconduct may 
have contributed to the jury’s guilty verdict, the reviewing court will 
ordinarily let the conviction stand.52 That means, if the prosecutor’s 
transgression was by nature unlikely to influence the jury, was adequately 
remedied by the trial judge,53 or was unlikely to have mattered given the 
overwhelming evidence of guilt, the appellate court may acknowledge 
that the prosecutor misbehaved but conclude that it probably did not 
matter. In many jurisdictions, the hurdle is even higher if the defense 
 
AMERICAN ADVOCACY 125–31, 140–41 (2d ed. 1913) (addressing excesses and improprieties in 
prosecutors’ opening and closing statements). 
49. See United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1990) (discussing how trial courts 
must make immediate decisions when confronted by the offending conduct of an attorney in open 
court). 
50. See United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1183 (2d Cir. 1981) (“As a practical matter, 
prosecutors know that courts are reluctant to overturn convictions because of improper remarks, 
when the defendant’s guilt is clear.”). 
51. See generally Michael T. Fisher, Note, Harmless Error, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and Due 
Process: There’s More to Due Process than the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1298, 1301–02 
(1988). 
52. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 56 N.E. 1001, 1004 (N.Y. 1900); see generally Bruce Green & 
Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 63 (2016); 
Lauren Morehouse, Note, Demanding the Last Word: Why Defendants Deserve the Final Closing 
Argument During the Sentencing Phase of Capital Cases, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 841, 864–65 
(2018). But see State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815, 820 (Minn. 1993) (overturning criminal 
conviction for prosecutorial misconduct “in the exercise of [the court’s] supervisory power over 
the trial courts and in the interests of justice”). 
53. See, e.g., State v. Hilton, 431 A.2d 1296, 1302 (Me. 1981) (“Only where there are 
exceptionally prejudicial circumstances or prosecutorial bad faith will a curative instruction be 
deemed inadequate to eliminate the prejudice.”); see generally Tara J. Tobin, Note, Miscarriage of 
Justice During Closing Arguments by an Overzealous Prosecutor and a Timid Supreme Court in 
State v. Smith, 45 S.D. L. REV. 186, 220–22 (2000) (discussing the “cured error doctrine” under 
which a prosecutor’s misconduct is deemed “cured” if the trial judge took adequate remedial 
measures by correcting the prosecutor’s improper statement or instructing the jury to ignore it). 
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never objected to the prosecutor’s misbehavior at trial.54 
Second, in issuing opinions regarding prosecutors’ trial conduct, 
appellate courts often establish or reaffirm standards of trial conduct, 
whether or not they overturn the conviction. This is an important 
regulatory role, because the relevant professional conduct rules, which 
are written at a high level of generality, do not themselves give lawyers, 
including prosecutors, necessary guidance. Whenever appellate courts 
review challenges to how prosecutors questioned witnesses or argued to 
the jury, the courts have the chance to say whether the prosecutor’s 
conduct was permissible and explain why. This has an important 
pedagogic function. Courts expect prosecutors to become familiar with 
the teachings of their opinions (if not the opinions themselves), because 
prosecutors’ offices train their prosecutors on the law and because 
prosecutors (like all lawyers) have a professional responsibility to keep 
up with the law bearing on their work.55 Particularly for prosecutors who 
prefer to learn by the case method, published opinions provide a chance 
to learn from prior real-life experience.56 
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in Calhoun v. United States,57 where the 
prosecutor made “racially charged” comments while cross examining the 
defendant and on summation,58 is an example of an opinion meant almost 
exclusively to serve a pedagogic function. The principal contested issue 
at trial was whether the defendant, who was in a hotel room when an 
acquaintance sold drugs to an undercover drug agent, knew of the deal in 
advance and had come to help.59 The defendant testified that he was 
unaware of the drug deal.60 The prosecutor responded that the defendant 
must have known that drugs were to be sold because, “You’ve got 
African-Americans, you’ve got Hispanics, you’ve got a bag full of 
money.”61 It was wrong for the prosecutor to suggest that race should 
play a role in determining whether the defendant had criminal intent, said 
Justice Sotomayor, but the conviction had to stand because the 
 
54. See generally James A. Morrow & Joshua R. Larson, Without a Doubt, a Sharp and Radical 
Departure: The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision to Change Plain Error Review of 
Unobjected-to Prosecutorial Error in State v. Ramey, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 351 (2008). 
55. On prosecutors’ obligation to engage in ongoing learning, see Connick v. Thompson, 563 
U.S. 51, 65 (2011). 
56. Cf. Bruce A. Green, There but for Fortune: Real-Life vs. Fictional “Case Studies” in Legal 
Ethics, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 977–78 (2000) (advocating the use of real-life case studies in 
teaching legal ethics). 
57. 568 U.S. 1206 (2013) (Sotomayor, J.) (respecting the denial of certiorari). 
58. Id. at 1206. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 1206–07. 
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defendant’s trial lawyer failed to object at the time.62 Therefore, the Court 
did not accept the case for review. Justice Sotomayor nonetheless wrote 
an opinion to express her “hope never to see a case like this again.”63 
But at the same time, appellate courts express frustration when 
prosecutors do not adhere to their teachings. An 1889 opinion of the 
California Supreme Court, bemoaning that “[w]e have been called upon 
many times to caution, sometimes to rebuke, prosecuting officers for the 
overzealous performance of their duties,”64 suggested that judges were 
reaching the limits of their patience 130 years ago. More than a century 
later, appellate courts still express frustration about prosecutors’ 
recurring courtroom misbehavior.65 
Notwithstanding their frustration, appellate courts are traditionally 
reluctant to serve an explicit disciplinary function. On top of 
considerations that generally discourage judges from serving a 
disciplinary role in cases of prosecutorial misconduct, some appellate 
judges may assume that disciplining prosecutors is better left to trial 
judges who are present when misconduct occurs and witnessed the 
conduct in question, rather than to appellate judges reading trial 
transcripts. On occasion, frustrated appellate courts have threatened 
prosecutors with personal sanctions, whether formal or informal, when 
prosecutors have ignored the teachings of prior opinions.66 Courts have 
threatened to rebuke errant prosecutors by name in published opinions as 
a form of informal professional discipline,67 and have even threatened 
 
62. Id. at 1207–08. 
63. Id. at 1209. 
64. People v. Lee Chuck, 20 P. 719, 723 (Cal. 1889). 
65. See, e.g., United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1981) (“We . . . find 
ourselves in a situation with which this Court is all too familiar: a prosecutor has delivered an 
improper summation, despite this Court’s oft-expressed concern over the frequency with which 
improper prosecution summations occur.”). 
66. See, e.g., id. at 1186 (“[W]e hope to have made it clear that improper summations in the 
future, especially if done on repeated occasions by the same prosecutor, run the distinct risk of 
direct sanctions against the attorney.”); Bell v. State, 723 So. 2d 896, 897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) 
(Altenbernd, J., concurring) (urging creation of a videotape on proper jury argument to be shown 
to lawyers who violate the rules, and that “[a]fter two or three viewings, if an attorney still cannot 
argue within the rules, other more serious sanctions should be imposed either by a supervising 
attorney or by the trial court”). 
67. Cf. Modica, 663 F.2d at 1185 (noting appellate courts’ ability to name prosecutors in 
published opinions as a form of reprimand, but adding that most courts are reluctant to do so and 
refraining from naming the prosecutor in this specific case). On judicial shaming as a strategy for 
influencing prosecutors’ conduct, see Lara Bazelon, For Shame: The Public Humiliation of 
Prosecutors by Judges to Correct Wrongful Convictions, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 305 (2016); 
Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial 
Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059 (2009). 
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disbarment.68 But courts rarely if ever make good on their threats.69 
Appellate courts express hope that their threats will lead prosecutors to 
follow the rules while acknowledging that past threats have been 
ineffective, leaving appellate courts at a loss for how to serve a 
constructive disciplinary role. 
III.  THE NEED TO ENHANCE DISCIPLINARY REGULATION OF 
PROSECUTORS’ IN-COURT MISCONDUCT 
As described in Part II, courts’ conventional responses to prosecutors’ 
visible forensic misconduct serve various salutary objectives. Appellate 
courts issue opinions establishing and elaborating on the standards 
governing prosecutors’ behavior at trial in order to educate prosecutors 
about what the law expects. Both trial judges and appellate judges take 
steps to remedy misconduct when it occurs—trial judges by sustaining 
objections and issuing curative instructions, and appellate judges by 
overturning convictions that were tainted by prosecutorial misconduct. 
Trial judges can also deter prosecutors’ further misbehavior in the 
particular trials over which the judges preside by issuing stern rebukes or 
through harsher measures. However, judges ordinarily overlook the 
disciplinary function, which aims to deter misconduct in future 
proceedings both by the particular lawyer who misbehaves and by other 
lawyers.70 Judges rarely refer prosecutors to disciplinary authorities for 
low-level forensic misconduct or impose sanctions on their own. 
In theory, professional discipline is a possibility when prosecutors 
misbehave in court.71 Disciplinary authorities can read court opinions and 
transcripts and initiate proceedings on their own. In practice, however, 
 
68. See, e.g., Bell, 723 So. 2d at 897 (“If trial attorneys recognize improper argument and persist 
in its use, they should not be members of The Florida Bar.”). 
69. See Spiegelman, supra note 4, at 169–70 (“Other than censuring through reversals, the 
commonsense remedy for recidivist prosecutors is to reveal them by naming them, by reprimanding 
them in published opinions, and even by referring them to local bars for discipline. However, one 
of the striking realities of the forty-five recent federal reversals is that despite findings of intentional 
misconduct and extensive criticism of prosecutors’ conduct, not one court ordered a prosecutor 
disciplined or referred a prosecutor for discipline.”). 
70. See, e.g., Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Havercamp, 442 N.W.2d 67, 69 (Iowa 1989) 
(noting that the determination of “whether and to what extent discipline should be imposed. . . . is 
guided by certain well-recognized standards: the nature of the alleged violations, the need for 
deterrence, protection of the public, maintenance of the reputation of the law as a whole, and the 
respondent’s fitness to continue in the practice of law”). 
71. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Farrell, Note, Advocacy, Justice, and Prosecutorial Misconduct: The 
Death of the Prosecutor’s Reasonable Inference on Credibility Issues, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 299, 
321–23 (2002) (asserting that the courts should not reverse convictions as a deterrent for 
prosecutorial misconduct that was harmless, because prosecutors are subject to professional 
discipline). 
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disciplinary authorities show little interest in regulating low-level 
prosecutorial misconduct, including prosecutors’ forensic misconduct. 
This is not simply because disciplinary authorities are traditionally 
reluctant to proceed against prosecutors for any misconduct.72 It is largely 
because, even though prosecutors’ forensic misconduct occurs on the 
record and is therefore easy to prove, disciplinary authorities regard this 
misconduct to be too insignificant to deserve formal disciplinary 
sanctions. 
Like prosecutors themselves, disciplinary authorities exercise 
discretion in deciding when to bring charges.73 In doing so, authorities 
ordinarily take account of the seriousness of the wrongdoing and the 
extent of the wrongdoer’s culpability. There are few cases of public 
discipline imposed against civil litigators for low-level misconduct such 
as discovery abuse or frivolous filings, notwithstanding the perception 
that this misconduct is rife. Disciplinary authorities reserve their efforts 
for more serious wrongdoing. Because prosecutors’ forensic misconduct 
is often unpremeditated and its impact is often insignificant, disciplinary 
authorities tend to disregard it.74 In other words, disciplinary authorities 
act out of the same sense of proportionality as trial judges. Therefore, if 
the trial judge did not refer the prosecutor’s conduct to the disciplinary 
authority, the disciplinary authority might understandably defer to the 
trial judge’s presumed judgment that a disciplinary sanction would be 
excessive. 
Although proportionality is an important principle, it is questionable 
whether minor, but visible, prosecutorial infractions should be ignored 
entirely in the disciplinary process. Contemporary social science 
teachings offer reasons to worry that this strategy fosters not only 
recurring low-level misconduct but more serious wrongdoing.75 
There is no one reason why people violate rules in general, and no one 
reason why prosecutors do so in particular. But studies identify factors 
 
72. This may be changing. See Green & Levine, supra note 9, at 144–45 (discussing how recent 
high-profile disciplinary cases have spurred a more serious response by disciplinary agencies to 
prosecutorial misconduct); Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 52, at 78–83 (discussing various ABA 
rules, state bar ethics committee resolutions, and state court holdings that have increased 
regulations on prosecutorial misconduct). 
73. See generally Bruce A. Green, Lawyer Discipline: Conscientious Noncompliance, 
Conscious Avoidance, and Prosecutorial Discretion, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1307 (1998). 
74. For notable exceptions, see In re Zawada, 92 P.3d 862, 866–67, 871 (Ariz. 2004) 
(suspending a prosecutor for improper trial tactics), and In re Weber, 2012 Ill. Atty. Reg. Disc. 
LEXIS 75, 139, 141–43 (May 3, 2012) (recommending that the prosecutor be censured for 
improprieties in jury arguments). 
75. See infra notes 77–84 and accompanying text. 
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that may have the effect of discouraging or encouraging wrongdoing. 
Ordinary intuition suggests that, if disciplinary authorities do not sanction 
lawyers for improper questioning and arguments, then prosecutors will 
lose respect for the underlying rules and judicial rulings and violate them 
more frequently than if the rules were enforced through sanctions.76 
Social science scholarship accords with that intuition. 
One reason why judicial indifference is problematic is that, insofar as 
prosecutors engage in an implicit balancing of risks and rewards, 
courtroom misconduct comes with no personal risk. The costs of 
misbehavior are all externalized. If wrongdoing contributes to a 
conviction, the defendant suffers. In the unlikely event that a trial court 
grants a mistrial or an appellate court overturns a conviction, the 
prosecutor’s office bears a cost. While the office may impose some 
internal sanction on the prosecutor in such a case, it is just as likely that, 
for any of several reasons, the office will support the trial prosecutor. 
Punishing the prosecutor may undermine group solidarity and lead 
prosecutors to act in an overly cautious manner. Therefore, if the question 
is a close one, the office may defend the prosecutor’s behavior, and even 
if the trial prosecutor’s behavior was clearly wrongful, the office may 
excuse it on the theory that a suitably aggressive prosecutor cannot help 
but get carried away occasionally. 
One might hope that, for the individual prosecutor who misbehaves, a 
judge’s rebuke on the trial record will have a lasting impact, thereby 
serving as a deterrent beyond the trial in which the rebuke is issued. But 
the greater likelihood is that a judge’s rebuke will have, at most, a 
momentary sting. Various cognitive factors may undermine the longevity 
of its impact. Where prosecutors have no lasting reminder of the rebuke, 
they may experience “unethical amnesia”: The memory of their 
professional misbehavior and whatever embarrassment resulted may fade 
over time.77 
The literature also suggests the possibility that institutional tolerance 
 
76. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
675, 739 (2003) (“[W]hen rule violations that are visible or well-known go unsanctioned, such 
failure to prosecute undermines the professional standard as a credible threat. It encourages other 
lawyers to violate the particular standard or the codes as a whole.” (footnotes omitted)). 
77. See generally Maryam Kouchaki & Francesca Gino, Memories of Unethical Actions 
Become Obfuscated Over Time, 113 PNAS 6166 (2016), 
http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/113/22/6166.full.pdf; see also Lisa L. Shu & Francesca Gino, 
Sweeping Dishonesty Under the Rug: How Unethical Actions Lead to Forgetting of Moral Rules, 
102 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1164, 1164 (2012) (describing a study showing “moral 
forgetting”—that is, that those engaging in unethical behavior are more likely to forget the moral 
rules). 
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of small acts of misconduct can lead to bigger ones. This is the problem 
of “ethical slippage,”78 also known as “incrementalism” or the “slippery 
slope.”79 If prosecutors, while vigorously trying cases, can get away with 
overreaching in little visible ways, they may grow less hesitant to commit 
more serious, but less visible, misconduct. 
Even if one disputes that judges tolerate prosecutorial misconduct, the 
absence of a disciplinary consequence effaces the ethical dimension of 
prosecutors’ in-court behavior. Improprieties in examining witnesses, 
evidentiary offers, and arguments may be perceived to be an evidentiary 
problem, not an ethical problem. The consequence is that prosecutors 
may lose, or never gain, a “moral awareness”80—an awareness of the 
ethical implications of their courtroom conduct—and may simply 
perceive the question presented by their questionable conduct as one of 
admissibility. Well-intentioned prosecutors are more likely to take 
evidentiary risks than ethical risks, and are more likely to skirt the bounds 
of inadmissibility than of moral propriety. 
One might worry about the impact of disciplinary indifference not only 
on the individual prosecutor but on the culture of the prosecutor’s office. 
In addressing ethical questions, lawyers are influenced by their peers.81 
Consequently, the cultures of the institutions in which people work 
significantly influence the extent of their compliance with rules.82 This is 
 
78. Cf. Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s 
Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial Risk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209, 
1214 (2011) (“[E]thical slippage is often the precursor to what later becomes a violation of law: 
moral rationalization leads to small levels of opportunism about which no guilt is felt, leading to 
sequentially bigger levels of cheating before the reality of legal wrongdoing becomes clear.”). 
79. See Tigran W. Eldred, Insights from Psychology: Teaching Behavioral Legal Ethics as a 
Core Element of Professional Responsibility, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 757, 780 n.93, 791–93  
(observing that “[r]esearch demonstrates that it is easier for people to engage in unethical behavior 
incrementally—that is, by gradually increasing the severity of infractions over time—rather than 
abruptly and all at once” (citing authority)); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, 
Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1120–24 (2013) (discussing how ethical slippery 
slopes “contribute to a process of ethical fading or moral disengagement”). 
80. See generally Robert A. Prentice, Behavioral Ethics: Can It Help Lawyers (and Others) Be 
Their Best Selves?, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 35, 47–49 (2015) (discussing moral 
awareness in the context of lawyers’ ethics). 
81. See Bruce Green & Jane Campbell Moriarty, Rehabilitating Lawyers: Perceptions of 
Deviance and its Cures in the Lawyer Reinstatement Process, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 139, 160 
n.79 (2012) (citing authority). 
82. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933 
(2017). 
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true for the culture of lawyers’ offices,83 including those of prosecutors.84 
If judges do not adequately police minor prosecutorial misconduct 
occurring in plain view, they may permit an institutional culture to 
develop or persist where prosecutors treat more serious rules equally 
cavalierly. 
None of this is to suggest that prosecutors should be disbarred for 
forensic misconduct. It is simply to suggest that courts should look for a 
response to prosecutors’ low-level courtroom misbehavior that, although 
not excessive, adequately serves the regulatory objectives of professional 
discipline—and, in particular, deterrence. 
IV.  A PROPOSAL: “REBUKE BANKS” 
When prosecutors engage in visible forensic misconduct, courts 
seeking to serve a disciplinary role face the challenge of discouraging 
future prosecutorial misconduct without punishing prosecutors too 
harshly. The sanctions afforded by the formal disciplinary process—
disbarment, suspension, public reprimand, or private censure—may seem 
too harsh, especially for what may appear to the judge before whom the 
misconduct occurs to be an isolated, unpremeditated, and harmless 
infraction. Prosecutors, like all lawyers, are imperfect. An occasional 
improper question, attempt to offer inadmissible evidence, or improper 
argument, will typically appear to be an innocent mistake, undeserving 
of a sanction that will stain the prosecutor’s entire career. Erring on the 
side of leniency, courts typically settle at most for on-the-record rebukes, 
which provide little, if any, deterrence.85 
This Article proposes an initiative that may strike a better balance 
between the competing interests in proportionality and deterrence: that 
courts establish repositories of trial transcripts reflecting prosecutors’ 
misbehavior. When the trial judge rebukes a prosecutor, or concludes in 
retrospect that the prosecutor deserved rebuke, the relevant portion of the 
trial transcript should be added to a searchable database. The purpose 
would be to enable courts and disciplinary authorities to track cases in 
which a particular prosecutor misbehaves as well as cases in which 
prosecutors from a particular office or unit of an office engage in similar 
 
83. See Catherine Gage O’Grady, Behavioral Legal Ethics, Decision Making, and the New 
Attorney’s Unique Professional Perspective, 15 NEV. L.J. 671, 681 (2015); Milton C. Regan, Jr., 
Nested Ethics: A Tale of Two Cultures, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 143, 155–60 (2013). 
84. See, e.g., Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors’ Ethics in Context, in 
LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 269 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn 
Mather eds., 2012). 
85. Some have regarded courtroom rebukes as a form of sanction, albeit the most ineffectual. 
See Singer, supra note 2, at 273–74. 
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misbehavior. 
These repositories—or “rebuke banks”—would be intended to serve 
several functions. 
First, they would serve a pedagogic function by compiling concrete 
examples of prosecutorial misbehavior. Although some instances of 
courtroom misconduct are already reflected in published appellate 
opinions, many are not. There is no appellate review if defendants are 
acquitted; convicted defendants may not raise prosecutors’ forensic 
misconduct as a point on appeal if there is no likelihood that the appellate 
court will find it to be prejudicial; and appellate courts do not publish 
opinions in all cases where prosecutors acted improperly at trial. The trial 
transcripts in the repositories will therefore add significantly to training 
material now made available in published opinions. 
Second, the rebuke banks would enable courts and disciplinary 
authorities to punish serious and repeat offenders. Courts and 
commentators recognize that prosecutors who repeatedly flout the rules 
should be sanctioned.86 But courts have not necessarily taken the 
initiative to learn whether a particular prosecutor’s misbehavior is an 
isolated occurrence or one in a series of similar wrongs. If prosecutors’ 
occasional transgressions can be overlooked, their transgressions in trial 
after trial should not be. At some point, a prosecutor who repeatedly 
misbehaves, even if out of ignorance or indifference, should be 
sanctioned. 
Third, to the extent that rebukes are meant to have some deterrent 
effect on the individual prosecutor beyond the particular trial in which a 
judge issues it, preserving records of rebukes will amplify their impact. 
That is because the slate is not wiped clean once the trial is over. The 
prosecutor will be reminded that the record of misconduct is preserved. 
The rebuke functions like a demerit—it is not itself a sanction, but added 
together, a succession of rebukes may justify a sanction. 
If individual rebukes have greater sting in themselves, and recurring 
rebukes can lead to formal professional sanctions, the cost of misconduct 
will no longer be externalized. Trial prosecutors engaging in cost-benefit 
analyses will have a greater incentive to comply with the rules.87 Once 
 
86. See, e.g., Bidish Sarma, Using Deterrence Theory to Promote Prosecutorial Accountability, 
21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 573, 628 (2017) (“Given that repeat offenders represent—or at least 
appear to represent—a significant problem in the realm of prosecutorial misconduct, disciplinary 
bodies should prioritize apprehending and punishing those prosecutors who have violated the rules 
on multiple occasions.”). 
87. See Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving 
Prosecutor: Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 45 
(2005). 
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rebuked, the prosecutor will have a motivation to learn the applicable 
standards of courtroom behavior, to practice employing them rather than 
falling back on intuitive conduct, and ultimately to act more carefully in 
future trials. New prosecutors seeking to avoid having their misconduct 
memorialized may be motivated to take care even before receiving a first 
judicial rebuke. 
Fourth, keeping records of prosecutors’ low-level misconduct will 
allow courts and disciplinary authorities to ascertain when an office, or 
unit of an office, is responsible for a disproportionate amount of 
misbehavior. Judicial or disciplinary authorities can then explore whether 
repeated offenses reflect a failure on the part of particular managerial or 
supervisory prosecutors to make reasonable efforts to ensure trial 
prosecutors’ compliance with the relevant rules. If so, authorities can 
impose discipline or adopt other regulatory measures.88 Further, the risk 
of discipline may motivate managers and supervisors in the prosecutor’s 
office to perform their supervisory responsibilities more diligently. 
Fifth, through the various mechanisms identified above, increased 
judicial attention to low-level misconduct may strengthen trial and 
supervisory prosecutors’ commitment to compliance with the norms of 
courtroom behavior, leading to enhancing the office’s internal culture and 
controls.89 Ideally, a stronger culture of compliance will result in greater 
compliance with all norms of prosecutorial conduct, thereby reducing 
serious as well as minor misconduct. 
All of this speaks to prosecutors’ compliance with the law, not to their 
exercise of discretion. But, finally, there may even be an incidental 
benefit in that area as well. Many on the defense side perceive that 
prosecutors lack empathy for their clients.90 This may be in part because 
prosecutors, regarding themselves as rule-abiding, lack sympathy or 
understanding toward those who break society’s rules. Prosecutors who 
are confronted with the reality that they and their colleagues are also 
occasional rule breakers may develop a better understanding that people 
are imperfect, that basically law-abiding people are susceptible to various 
kinds of pressures to break the rules, and that those who break the law do 
not invariably deserve punishment. Prosecutors who acknowledge that 
they and their colleagues are imperfect and have benefitted from the 
disciplinary process’s leniency may be influenced to extend greater 
leniency to those who transgress minor criminal laws. 
 
88. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.1(a)–(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
89. On the importance of internal controls in prosecutors’ offices, see generally Rachel E. 
Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2089 (2010). 
90. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, Are Prosecutors Born or Made?, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 943, 
955–57 (2012). 
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The ultimate objective is to identify a measured, proportionate 
response to prosecutors’ low-level, on-the-record misconduct that, 
standing alone, does not merit public discipline or an equivalent stigma. 
Entirely ignoring the disciplinary implications of prosecutors’ 
misconduct places too much weight on prosecutors’ interest in 
proportionality at the expense of the public interests served by the 
disciplinary process. Maintaining records of individual prosecutors’ 
problematic courtroom conduct strikes a better balance. 
Of course, one can debate the details. For example, there is room for 
disagreement regarding whether the repositories should be open to the 
public, thereby augmenting the possibility of unfair stigma, or should be 
available only to courts and disciplinary authorities, notwithstanding that 
the transcripts are public records.91 There may also be disagreement 
concerning whether, before a transcript is included, some prior 
determination must be made that a judicial rebuke was deserved or that 
the prosecutor’s conduct was otherwise improper. Particularly if 
transcripts are publicly available, some predetermination may be justified 
so that prosecutors are not stigmatized when innocent behavior is 
included in the repository. On the other hand, if “probable cause” or the 
like must be found before a transcript is included, the stigma is likely to 
be even greater. Perhaps the ideal is a disclaimer that the repository is just 
a virtual storage facility and that no prejudgments are made about 
whether transcripts necessarily reflect misbehavior. 
One might also consider whether, after a period of time, transcripts 
should be removed or expunged, or whether, particularly given the 
infrequency of trials, records of misconduct should be preserved 
throughout lawyers’ careers in criminal prosecution. And prosecutors 
would doubtless propose that if transcripts of their misconduct are 
maintained in a rebuke bank, transcripts of defense lawyers’ misconduct 
should be deposited there as well. 
Resolving these questions to strike a fair balance is essential, because 
judges who think it is unduly harsh to keep records of rebukes may refrain 
from issuing rebukes to prosecutors who deserve them. This would be an 
example of what others identify as “remedial deterrence,” that is, where 
 
91. In Bartko v. United States DOJ, 898 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2018), the court of appeals 
considered the conflicting public and privacy interests in the context of a Freedom of Information 
Act request for documents of the Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility. In 
this particular case, the court determined that the public interest in documents relating to 
investigations of prosecutorial misconduct outweighed the individual prosecutor’s interest in 
privacy. 
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the costs of remedies deter courts from invoking them.92 While courts 
might be reluctant to deposit transcripts in the rebuke banks and may even 
be deterred from issuing rebukes, however, judges cannot avoid ruling on 
objections to prosecutors’ misconduct. The interest in ruling correctly, to 
avoid appellate reversals, should far outweigh whatever judicial 
sympathies or interests might lead trial judges to minimize or overlook 
prosecutors’ misbehavior. And, regardless of whether rebukes follow, 
records of sustained objections to prosecutors’ questions and arguments 
should themselves be preserved. Therefore, even if one acknowledges the 
risk that rebuke banks will deter some judges, and not just prosecutors, 
preserving searchable records of arguable prosecutorial misbehavior 
would better serve the public interest than consigning the records to 
oblivion. 
CONCLUSION 
Trial prosecutors’ visible misbehavior, such as improper questioning 
of witnesses and improper jury arguments, may not seem momentous. 
Sometimes, the improprieties are simply the product of poor training or 
overenthusiasm. In many cases, they pass unremarked. As the Chicago 
Eight trial illustrated, trial prosecutors’ improprieties may also be 
overshadowed by the excesses of other trial participants—the witnesses, 
the defendants, the defense lawyers, or even the trial judge. And when 
noticed, prosecutors’ trial misbehavior can ordinarily be remedied, and 
then restrained, by a capable trial judge. It is little wonder that 
disciplinary authorities, having bigger fish to fry, are virtually indifferent 
to the problem. And yet, in the obvious absence of disciplinary regulation, 
prosecutors and their offices have less motivation to “play by the rules.” 
The challenge for disciplinary regulation is to find a proportional 
response to trial misconduct—one that does not punish prosecutors 
undeservedly, unnecessarily, or too harshly but that nevertheless serves 
regulatory ends. Building on the Supreme Court’s observation in Berger 
that the prosecutor’s repeated improprieties should have been met with 
“stern rebukes,” this Article proposes that prosecutorial improprieties that 
are deserving of judicial rebuke should not be forgotten. Rather, 
repositories—or rebuke banks—should be maintained to preserve 
transcripts of prosecutors’ on-the-record misconduct, even when it is 
committed unintentionally. Maintaining these records, which would be 
relatively easy in the computer age, would serve salutary regulatory ends 
 
92. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
857, 884–85 (1999); Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking “Effective Remedies”: Remedial Deterrence in 
International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 695–96 (2008). 
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while maintaining the necessary sense of proportionality. 
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